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2Ramon Moreno·
The traditional critique ofthe "real bills" doctrine argues that the
price level may be unstable in a monetary regime without a central bank
and a market-determined money supply. Hong Kong's experience sug-
gests this problem may not arise in a small open economy.
In ourcentury, itis generally assumed that mone-
tary control exerted by central banks is necessary to
prevent excessive money creation and to achieve
price stability. More recently, in the 1970s, this
assumption is evidentin policymakers' concernthat
financial innovations have eroded monetary con-
trols. In particular, the proliferation of market-
created substitutes for money not directly under the
control of monetary authorities has led Phillip
Cagan (1979) to argue for regulatory reform:
New financial developments may make the
past degree ofmonetary control increasingly
more difficult to maintain. Yet pursuit of
national policies to restrain inflation and sta-
bilize economic activity appears impossible
without effective monetary controls. The
creationofa regulatory environment in which
the erosion of monetary controls is kept to a
minimum is particularly important in the
present period oframpant inflation.
Whilethis statementreflectsthe mainstreamview
today, it has not always been obvious that the
government, rather than the market, should deter-
mine the money supply. A market-determined
money supply is traditionally associated with the
long discredited "real bills" doctrine. This doctrine
* Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of San Fran-
cisco. Thanks to Mark Thomas for excellent
research assistance.
17
proposed that the money supply and inflation could
successfully be controlled by the market, without
central bankcontrol ofthe monetary base, as long as
banks limited their credit to "satisfy the needs of
trade".
The real bills doctrine was severely criticized on
the beliefthat it could lead to instability in the price
level. However, a number of leading economists
such as Fama (1980) and Sargent and Wallace
(1982, 1983) have recently argued in favor of re-
gimes where the money supply is market-deter-
mined.
In this respect, Hong Kong provides an interest-
ingexampleofan economywhere there is nocentral
bank, and where, to the extent possible, central
banking functions are minimized. Thus, it provides
a unique opportunity for ascertaining whether a
market-determinedmoney supply is consistent with
overall macroeconomic stability, particularly sta-
bility in the price level.
Section I reviews the real bills doctrine and dis-
cusses how it may be feasible in a small open
economy even ifit may lead to price instability in a
closed economy. The discussion identifies certain
testable features that distinguish a stable monetary
regime from an unstable one. These features form
the basis for an empirical test on the stability of
Hong Kong's monetary system in a later section.
Section II discusses three key features of Hong
Kong's monetary sector typically believed to influ-
ence money creation and monetary control: (I) the
note issuance mechanism under fixed and floatingexchangerates, (2) the interest-setting agreement of
the Hong Kong Association of Banks, and (3) li-
quidity ratios. Section HI reviews Hong Kong's
macroeconomic performance and includes an
empirical testofthe stability ofHong Kong's mone-
tary system under floating exchange rates as well as
a discussion ofexchange rate sta15ility.
The paper concludes that allowing the market to
determine the money supply in a small open econ-
Q!tiy may be consistent with price level stability
tlnder either fixed or floating exchange rates, and
that monetary authorities under such conditions
may relax their control over monetary aggregates.
Furthermore, such a prescription may be most
appropriate under a fixed exchange rate regime
since,underfloating rates, Hong Kong was unable
to counteract destabilizing speculation against the
value ofits currency.
I. The Real Bills Doctrine and the Price Level
The Closed Economy
For over two centuries, there was a widespread
belief that price stability could be achieved as long
as banks extended only short-term self-liquidating
loans for business needs. Known as the "real bills
doctrine", this viewpoint was once so influential it
was a premise underlying the creationofthe Federal
Reserve Systeml .
While John Law first proposed the real bills
doctrine in 1705, the classic statement on this
subject was provided by Adam Smith (1776). Smith
suggested that an appropriate rule for money crea-
tion is for each bankto "discount(s) to a merchant a
real bill ofexchange drawn by a real creditor upon a
real debtor, and which as soon as it is due, is really
paid by that debtor." In other words, Smith advo-
cated that banks only finance short-term commer-
cial paper arising from real transactions in goods
and services.
The original version of the real bills doctrine
appears to have emphasized short-term commercial
paperlinked to real economic activity to ensure that
banks indeed financed only those loans that would
be repaid.Byso doing, the doctrine also limited the
quantity of those loans. However, it may not be
necessary to restrict loans to certain types of
activities2 and to short maturities to guarantee
repayment. Instead, banks may be allowed to
finance any type of activity as long as they can
correctly assess credit risk. This last criterion will
still •satisfy the essential requirements of the real
billsdoctrine: thatloans respondto the requirements
ofthemarket, thatthey be selected in such a manner
that they will berepaid, and that the volume ofloans
be limited. Thus, modem interpretations ofthe real
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bills doctrine, as well as the presentation adopted
here, do not restrict loan supply to short-term com-
mercial paper.
The previous discussion also suggests two possi-
ble models ofthe real bills doctrine. In one model,
the real loan demand is defined in such a manner
that borrowers are assumed always to repay their
loans. In such a case, lenders could seek to accom-
modate any real loan demand by borrowers3 , and
thereal money supply thus passively accommodates
real money demand. Most presentations ofthe real
bills doctrine4 implicitly make this assumption,
which is equivalent to a monetary regime where a
central bank targets interest rates.
The real bills doctrine may also be modelled by
assuming that banks limit loan supply according to
their perception ofdefault risk. Real loan supply at
any given interestrate therefore will not necessarily
coincide with real loan demand because banks may
ration creditratherthan passivelyaccommodate real
credit demand. The result would be a loan and
money supply function that is upward sloping (over
a certain range) in relation to the rate ofinterest. A
money supply function that is upward sloping in
relation to interest rates also results ifone assumes
that .bank operations are characterized by rising
marginal costs. This is the supply function postu-
latedby Patinkin(1965). As shown in the appendix,
the macroeconomic equilibrium of a real bills re-
gime depends significantly on the loan and money
supply process assumed.
Most ofits earlyproponents believed that the real
bills doctrine would suffice to prevent an overissu-
anceof notes and to maintain a stable price level
because, under the doctrine, real loan supply wouldbe limited by real loan demand in the economy.5
(Alternatively, loan supply may be limited by the
perceived capacity to repay). Loan supply would in
tum limit money creation, since banks concerned
aboutthevalueoftheirmonetary liabilities would
seek to ensurethatthese are not excessive in relation
to the loan assets backing them. The flaw in this
reasoning is that ifthe nominal value ofbank assets
rises with inflation, then banks may also increase
the nominal value of their liabilities, and. create
more money, without penalty.
Critics ofthe real bills doctrine have emphasized
that while the market limits real loan supply and
real money creation, this does not mean that the
market will successfully limit nominal money sup-
ply or the price level. The mistake of the original
exponentsofthe real billsdoctrine was toconfusean
equilibrium in real terms with an equilibrium in
nominal terms. The appendix shows that in aclosed
economy, an endogenous or market-determined
money supply may be inconsistent with price level
stability. 6
Another fault ofthe real bills doctrine, first found
by Henry Thornton (1802), is the possibility of
accelerating inflation under a real bills regime.
Anticipating Wicksell by almost 100 years, Thorn-
ton argued that if interest rates were pegged below
the equilibrium there would be a persistent excess
demand for loans. Under the first model ofthe real
bills doctrine described above, the nominal increase
in loan supply to accommodate this excess demand
would result in an increase in money supply and
prices. The increasein priceswould reduce real loan
and money supply below equilibrium, and lead, in
tum, to a further increase in nominal loan demand
and nominal money. This would set offa process of
continued expansion of loans, money and prices.7
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, economistsin
recent years seeking to address the implications of
unregulated banking have attempted to rehabilitate
the real bills doctrine. 8
The Open Economy
Smith's analysis avoided traditional objections to
the real bills doctrineas the regime he describedwas
a small open economy following a. gold standard.
Under this system, which closely resembles Hong
Kong's monetary regime under fixed exchange
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rates,banksmay determinethe volume ofloans and
deposits createdontheconditionthat theirliabilities
be fully convertible to gold at a fixed rate. This
condition is sufficient to guarantee that banks will
have to limit the amount of money they create
according to the availability ofgold in the domestic
economy.9
In an open economy, convertibility to gold
implies that the external sector will regulate the
supplyofmoney and the pricelevel. The adjustment
process in such cases is traditionally described by
the classical price specie flow mechanism. An
excess supply ofmoney would tend to raisedomes-
tic prices and reduce international competitiveness.
This, in tum, would tend to produce a gold outflow
that would eliminate the excess supply of money
and lower domestic prices until a trade balance is
restored.
In a modem economy, a system analogous to a
gold standard would be one that requires convert-
ibility with some internationally traded asset at a
fixed exchange rate (such as sterling or the U.S.
dollar) and one in which capital mobility, as well as
trade flows, govern the adjustment process. An
excess supply of money in this case would tend to
lower domestic interest rates and thereby create an
incipient capital outflow. In the process ofaccom-
modating this capital outflow, the banking sector
would supply foreign assets in exchange for its
monetary liabilities at a fixed exchange rate. 10This
would preserve the fixed exchange rate while elim-
inating the excess money supply and preventing any
instability in the price level.
Under both the classical gold standard and a
modem economy with fixed exchange rates, a mar-
ket-determined money supply is well-defined and
self-limiting. Variations in the supply ofthe interna-
tionally traded asset would, however, induce fluc-
tuations in the domestic price level of a modem
economy such as Hong Kong's because the domes-
tic rate ofinflation depends on the rate ofgrowth of
theinternationally traded asset.
As shownin the appendix, the money supply may
also be self-limiting under flexible exchange rates if
two key assumptions hold: domestic output is not
fully insulated from the external sector, and the real
loan supply - and therefore the real quantity of
money supplied by profit-maximizing banks - ispositively related to interest rates. Capital mobility
pegsthedomesticinterestrateto the world rate. This
determines the real money supply. Atthe sametime,
interaction with the external sector determines an
exchange rate and a price level consistent with
moneymarketandgoods marketequilibrium. Since
the price level is stabilized by the external sector,
bank decisions affecting real loan supply in effect
determine nominal loan supply and nominal money
balances. Thereason this prescriptiondoes notwork
inaclosedeconomyis thataclosedeconomyhas no
external sector to regulate the price level.
Comparative statics exercises show that, at the
exchange rate and price level consistent with equi-
librium, an excess supply ofmoney would result in
an equilibrating reduction in loans and money
because banks would find that real loan supply
exceeds real loan demand at the prevailing rate of
interest. In contrast, when prices are above equi-
librium, the contractionary effects on the trade
balance and aggregate demand would result inequi-
librating price reductions. This contrasts sharply
withtheunstableThornton/Wicksellscenariowhere
money creation leads to price increases, and price
increases lead to further money creation. The dis-
tinction is the basis for later empirical tests on the
stability ofHong Kong's monetary regime.
A market-determined money supply under float-
ing rates may lead to price level instability ifeither
ofthetwokey assumptions madeabovedonothold.
Ifflexible exchangerates fully insulatethe domestic
econorny, the external sector will not stabilize the
domesticprice level. Price instability is also possi-
bleifbankspassively accommodate money demand
ratherthan limit money supply at any given interest
rate.
Asidefrom stability in money andprices, policy-
makersmaybeconcernedwithotherimplicationsof
an exchange rate regime. For example, in a small
openeconomy with a high degreeofcapital mobili-
ty, there may be sudden shifts in the demand for
domestic assets. Under fixed exchange rates, these
financial sector shocks can be offset by appropriate
variations indomestic moneysupply. Underflexible
exchange rates, these shocks are reflected in varia-
tions in the value of the currency. For a small
economy where trade represents a large proportion
ofgross national product, informational advantages
may favor a fixed exchange rate regime. Further-
more, persistent fluctuations in the value of the
currency may lead to destabilizing speculation. As
we shall see, the last consideration, in particular,
appears to have influenced the choice of an
exchange rate regime in Hong Kong.
II. Money and Monetary Control
A first step towards understanding the process of
money creation in Hong Kong is to recognize that
government intervention inHong Kong is generally
believed to be ineffective and harmful to growth.II
This non-interventionist philosophy manifests itself
in a conservative fiscal posture that is justified as a
means ofcontrolling money creation. Hong Kong's
government believes that "the public sector's
impact on the growth ofthe money supply should,
on the average, be neutral". 12
This philosophy is also apparent in the govern-
ment's reliance on the market to determine the
money supply. The market works within a frame-
work of three institutional restrictions thought to
influence money creation: the mechanics of note
issuance, the interest rate setting agreement of the
Hong Kong Association of Banks, and required
liquidity ratios. In this section, we review the
implications ofthese restrictions for price stability.
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Note Issuance and Currency Backing
Ina typical central banking regime, the monetary
authorities control the creation of base money,
defined as currency and reservesl 3, by limiting its
availability to private banks. Given the supply of
base money, a money multiplier (a function of the
banks' desired holdings of reserves in relation to
totald~positsand the public's desired ratio of cur-
rency to d~posit holdings) will then determine the
total money supply. Ina real bills regime, each bank
can either issue its own currency or, on its own
initiative, present some asset it holds to the govern-
ment in exchange for currency. In contrast to a
regime witha centralbank, where the availabilityof
currencyis controlledby themonetaryauthority, the
amount of currency in a real bills regime is deter-
mined bythe market, as is the total money supply. 14
Hong Kong's monetary system operates exactlylike a real bills regime. Two note-issuing banks
credit the account ofa government Exchange Fund
and receive the equivalent amount in Hong Kong
dollar certificates of indebtedness against which
HongKongdoHarnotesm<lYbe issued.•The cur-
rency issue by thenote-issuingbanks is thus backed
by the certificates of,indebtedness (CIs) of the
ExchangeFund. UnderHong Kong's monetary sys-
tem, there are no government monetary liabilities
other than the CIs, so the dornestic monetary base
consists only ofcurrency.
Itis worth emphasizing that note issuance occurs
onthe initiative ofthe privatenote-issuing banks. In
implementing its mandate to "regulate the
exchange value of the Hong Kong dollar," the
Exchange Fund has not resorted to direct manipula-
tion of the monetary base (through such familiar
instruments as open market operations, reserve
requirements, or the discount rate). Instead, it has
allowed the market to determine the money supply
while regulating the terms on which two note-
issuing banks issue currency. The basis for note
issuance has varied with the exchange rate regime,
with potential implications for price level stability.
Fixed Exchange Rates
In Hong Kong's system of money creation, the
Hong Kong dollar has been pegged to the U.S.
dollar since October 1983 and the two note-issuing
banks are required to hold government-issued cer-
tificates of indebtedness as backing for their note
issuance. The two banks pay the Exchange Fund in
foreign exchange when they desire to issue new
bank notes at the fixed rate of HK$7.80 per U.S.
dollarfor the certificates required as backingfor any
increase in note issuance. When bank notes are
withdrawn from circulation and the two banks sur-
render certificates of indebtedness, the Exchange
Fund pays the banks the equivalent foreign
exchange at the same fixed rate. The sterling stan-
dard in force priorto JulY1972 operatedin asimilar
fashion.
Un,der fixed exchange rates, the total money
supply dependsontotal foreign currencydeposits in
Hong Kong banks- which, in tum, determines the
monetary base - and a money multiplier that is a
function of the extent to which banks convert their
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foreign currency deposits for domestic currency
notes and the ratio of vault cash and currency to
deposits. This multiplier is illustrated in the box.
The fixed.exchange rate regime implemented in
Hong Kongis•consistenf\viththeconditions'for
price stabilityunder thereal bills regime proposed
byAdam Smith. Domestic notes arefullyconverti-
bleintoaninternationallytradedforeignassetdlle to
100 percent backing. And banks have to lirnit
deposit and money creation to ensure that their
liabilities can be fully convertedinto foreign cur-
rency.
An important difference between Hong K()ng's
ExchangeFund and a typical centralbankis that the
former does not actively intervene to achieve .fixed
exchangerates butrelies insteadonmarketarbitrage
to do so. Ifthe currency tends to depreciate (as when
there is an excess supply of money), banks would
have an incentive to redeem notes in exchange for
foreign currency at the higher rate offered by the
Exchange Fund, and then sell the foreign currency
ata profit in themarket. Thisprocess wouldleadto a
monetary contraction that would preserve the fixed
exchange rate (see example provided in box). Fur-
thermore, this fixed exchange rate mechanism guar-
antees passive control of the monetary base and
therefore of total money supply. Note issuance is
limited by requiring domestic banks to deposit
foreign assets at a fixed price to back currency
creation.
Flexible Exchange Rates
Under the regime in force betweenJuly 1972 and
October 1983 - a period largely corresponding to
that ofa floating Hong Kong dollar- note-issuing
banks were allowed to issue currency by crediting
the Exchange Fund with the equivalent in Hong
Kong dollar deposits. The Exchange Fund would
then seekto achieve full foreign currency backingof
the currency issue by purchasing foreign assets with
thesedeposits; itdid notrequirebanksto providethe
backing themselves. As a result, during this period,
foreign exchange availability no longerconstrained
the ability ofthe note-issuing banks to expand loan
or money creation. Currency could be created on
dernandby creatingadepositliabilityinHongKong
dollars with the Exchange Fund.2223An immediateeffectofthe 1972 revision was that
domestic monetary issuance by banks need not have
any relationship to the exchange rate set by the
government. Whenagovernmentpegs theexchange
rate,it will find itself unable to enforce the pegged
rate unless that rate was consistent with the market
equilibrium rate. Independent money creation by
banks could neutralize any effortby the government
to fix the exchange rates. This was the sequence of
events in Hong Kong between July 1972 and
November 1974. The government attempted to peg
the currency to the U.S. dollar only to abandon the
effort because ofthe limited impact ofits interven-
tion. In effect, Hong Kong went into a floating rate
regime by default because it had adopted an institu-
tional arrangement inconsistent with a fixed
exchange rate. As we shall show later, this institu-
tional arrangement would have implications for the
feasibility of stabilizing exchange rates in response
to shocks.
Abandoning the requirement that currency issu-
ance be backed by foreign assets also removed the
self-regulating mechanism that limits the monetary
base under fixed exchange rates. As discussed ear-
lier (and shown formally in the appendix), inasmall
openeconomy such as Hong Kong's, where flexible
exchange rates do not fully insulate the domestic
economy, interaction with the external sector may
nevertheless guarantee price level stability as long
as banks limit the loan and money supply at any
given interest rate.
If these conditions do not hold, money, prices,
and exchange rates in Hong Kong could be indeter-
minate orunstable. This view is held by a numberof
observers ofthe Hong Kong scene. For example, in
the December 1983 issue of the Asian Monetary
Monitor, John Greenwood remarked:
... Hong Kong's monetary arrangements
(underfloating exchange rates) constituted an
indeterminate, metastable equilibrium sys-
tem. This meant that for any given level of
money supply and prices in Hong Kong, the
exchangerate would adjust to that price level;
alternatively, given any level ofthe exchange
rate, money supplyand domestic prices would
adjust to that exchange rate. IS
Greenwood's reasoning is analogous to the tradi-
tional criticism ofthe real bills doctrine. The econ-
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omy may guarantee that real money demand equals
real money supply even as the nominal money
supply, prices and exchange rates are indeterminate
or unstable.
Interest-Setting in Hong Kong
Since 1964, banks in Hong Kong have restricted
the interest rates they pay on deposits with matu-
ritiesof less than twelve months to a level deter-
mined by the Hong Kong Association of Banks
(HKAB) or its predecessor, the Exchange Banks'
Association. This restriction was designed to pre-
vent the destabilizing interest rate competition
experienced during banking crises in the early
1960s, and was formalized in legislation in 1981
that established the HKAB and empowered it to
require banks to observe the interest rates it estab-
lished. While this agreement was originally estab-
lished for prudential reasons, subsequent discus-
sions of its function have focused on the
implications for price stability and monetary con-
trol.
Jao (1984) and Fry (1985) assert that the HKAB
set interest rates consistently below the equilibrium
determined by the world market. Given our earlier
discussionofWicksell and Thornton, it would seem
that such a policy could create the potential for
hyperinflation on the assumption that banks would
set the loan rate as well as the deposit rate below the
marketequilibrium. Competition in the loan market
could prevent this from happening. FurthernlOre,
given that the loan rate was in fact set below the
market equilibrium, the Thornton/Wicksell view
also assumes that banks continually seek to accom-
modate an excess demand for loans. This may not
occur if profit-maximizing banks respond to an
ex<;ess demand for loans by rationing credit rather
than continually raising the nominal loan and
money supply.
There are also indications that the ability of the
HKAB to influence interest rates was limited, par-
ticularly as the 1970s progressed, and that it proba-
bly had to adjust its interest rates to reflect market
conditions. One reason it may have been forced to
raise rates is that the profitability of Hong Kong's
financial system depends on attracting depositors
who have access to the Euromarket. Hong Kong
banks must therefore pay internationally competi-
tive rates. By affecting the cost of funds in acompetitive lending environment, the external sec-
tor would tend to bring overall Hong Kong interest
rates into line with the world market.equilibrium,
and thereby limit the ability of the HKAB to set
deposit rates that were excessively out ofequi-
librium.
Anotherfactor thatmay have limitedthe abilityof
the HKAB to determine interest rates was the rapid
growthofDepositTaking Companies(DTCs) inthe
1970s. DTCs were financial intermediaries that, up
to 1976, had avo.ided banking restrictions by limit-
ing their business to deposits with maturities in
excessofthreemonths. As DTCs were notsubjectto
the interest rate agreement, they undoubtedly made
it increasingly difficult for the Hong Kong Associa-
tion ofBanks to fix the interest rate. The frequency
with which interest rates were revised suggests that
the DTCs were influential. The HKAB revised its
deposit rates only once, in 1976 when the Deposit
Taking Ordinance was passed. This ordinance
allowed DTC deposits ofany maturity but imposed
other restrictions on their operation. In 1980,
however, just before major additional restrictions
were imposed on DTCs, the HKAB revised its
deposit rates 13 times. Thus, while concern about
their inflationary impact was typically associated
with DTCs, DTCs probably helped ensure that
market considerations prevailed in determining
interest rates in Hong Kong. The impact of the
HKAB interest-setting agreement may therefore
have been limited to some distortion of the term
structure ofinterest rates, and, as in other countries
where restrictions of this kind are imposed, may
have reduced the availability of savings.
The government could use the interest-setting
powers ofthe HKAB as an instrument for monetary
control to the extent that the HKAB was not limited
by competition to adjusting interest rates passively
in response to market conditions. Variations in the
interest rate could induce desired changes in real
money demand or supply, and affect prices and
exchange rates. However, this approach would not
always work, as the criteria used by the HKAB in
setting interest rates need not be based on mac-
roeconomic considerations.
Furthermore, the government appears to have
been unable to use the interest rate agreement to
achieve certain macroeconomic objectives on cer-
tain critical occasions. For example, during the
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1982-83 episode in which uncertainty about the
future government ofHong Kong caused the value
ofits currencyto plummet, a risein the rate paid on
Hong Kong dollar deposits could have dampened
th~dropin.the value ofthe currency. Instead, the
HKAB was reportedly reluctant to raise interest
rates, .and the government was reluctant to insist. 16
Liquidity Ratios
Aside. from the mechanics of note issuance and
the int~rest rate.agreement, the liquid assets ratio
requirement is typically cited as a potential means
for limiting the money supply in Hong Kong. Also
established for prudential, rather than mac-
roeconomic, reasons, this institutional restriction
requires that the ratio of liquid asset holdings
(mostly vault cash and foreign assets, given the
limited amount of marketable government
securities) of banks to deposits exceed twenty-five
percent.
In Hong Kong, this requirement is often believed
to restrict money creation in a manner analogous to
reserve requirements. However, the analogy is
invalid since the market, and not the government,
determines the creation of liquid assets by the
acquisition of foreign currency deposits or the
mechanism of note issuance described previously.
Thus, the liquid assets ratio has not functioned as a
reserve requirement in the sense ofrequiring banks
to hold liabilities of the government monetary
authority, the supply of which is determined by
policymakers. Inparticular, base money creation by
banks could nuIIi:ry any effects ofliquidassets ratio
requirements. In any case, the government has
altered the liquid assets requirements very infre-
quently.
It may also be noted that the liquid assets ratio
was not binding on banks, which typically held
liquid assets significantly above the required level.
Forexample, between 1972 and 1984, the year-end
liquidity ratio ofbanks averaged well inexcess of40
percent. Up to the early 1980s, deposit-taking com-
panies, which were close competitors of banks,
were not subject to liquid ass~ts ratio requirements.
The weakness of liquidity ratios as instruments
for monetary policy under floating rates is illus-
trated by the effortofthe government to use them to
control money creation at the end ofthe 1970s. In
February 1979, the government imposed a 100percent liquid assets requirement on deposits ofthe
Exchange Fund. As a result, note-issuing banks had
to hold either currency or foreign exchange assets
against these deposits.
If the constraint were binding, it would tend to
contract the money multiplier, as the banks' vault
cash to deposit ratio would have to rise. However, it
would not necessarily limit the creation of base
money. As the Hong Kong dollar depreciated, a
fixed amount of foreign assets used to serve the
liquidity requirement could support an increasing
amount ofdomestic currency creation. That is, the
effectiveness ofthis policy as a means for controll-
ing the money supply was diluted because the gov-
ernmentdid not seta price for the Hong Kong dollar
in relation to its foreign currency liquid assets
cover. 17
Our brief review of Hong Kong's monetary re-
gime suggests that the stability of Hong Kong's
moneyand price level depends on the process gov-
erning note issuance, including the pegged
exchaJ1ge rate arrangement, and that other institu-
tional r~strictions, such as the interest-setting agree-
mentof theHKABor liquid assets ratio require-
ments, are oflimited importance.
Unlike most modern economies, base money
creation in Hong Kong results from the initiative of
two private note-issuing banks whose decisions are
based.on market considerations. The institutional
restrictions on note issuance guarantee that money
creation is self-limiting under fixed exchange rates.
The stability of Hong Kong's monetary system
underfloating exchange rates is less obvious. Lead-
ing observers believe that the monetaryprocess may
have beenunstable, and theory is ambiguous on this
point. A closer look at the empirical evidence is
therefore indicated.
m. Hong Kong's Macroeconomic Performance
Macroeconomic Indicators
If Hong Kong's monetary system had adverse
effects on its economy, it is not apparent in the
performance ofthe real sector. Real gross domestic
product (GDP) growth averaged 8.0 percent
between 1966-1972 when exchange rates were
fixed, and 8.5 percentbetween 1974-1983 when the
Hong Kong dollar was floating. In fact, as shown in
Table I, Hong Kong's economic growth has been
among the highest in the world since the early
1960s.
This remarkable growth is partly attributable to a
competitive labor market that has resulted in a high
degree of real wage flexibility. Between 1974 and
1982, real wage growth averaged only 1.9 percent,
and itfell sharply during certain years. Forexample,
real wages fell 12 percentfollowing the first interna-
tional oil price shockin 1974, and 11 percentduring
the severe world recession of 1975.
Unemployment data, available on a yearly basis
only since 1975, suggest a satisfactory economic
performance. The unemployment rate averaged 4.4
percent between 1975 and 1983 notwithstanding
periodic surges in the labor force caused by immi-
gration, such as the Y2 million immigrants from the
Chinese mainland between 1978 and 1981.
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One feature ofa regime where the money supply
is market-determined is that movements in the
money supply tend to be procyclical. For example,
Ml dropped 5 percent in 1974 and may have con-
tributed to the rise in the unemployment rate to 9.1
percent in 1975. However, the cost ofa procyclical
monetary adjustment was offset by a drop in the
inflation rate from 16 percent in 1974to 1.6percent
the year after.
Furthermore, flexible real wages have undoubt-
edly been a major stabilizing influence and reduced
the need for countercyclical monetary policy. For
example, although annual real GDP growth slowed
during the world recessions of 1975 and 1982 (to
2.2 and 2.9 percent, respectively), Hong Kong has
not experienced a GDP decline in at least twenty
years. While the costs to the real sector of Hong
Kong's market-determined monetary regime are not
evident, it is also necessary to investigate whether
the stability of prices and exchange rates was
affected.
As shown in Table 2, Hong Kong's inflation rate
averaged 4.7 percent in the period 1966-1972 when
fixed exchange rates applied. During the period
when Hong Kong's currency floated, the average
inflation rate almost doubled to 9.3 percent, but it27remained below that offive ofthe other six develop-
ing countries in the table. Furthermore, it was not
much higher than the inflation rate ofthe U.S. (8.5
percent) or Japan (7.8 percent).
Aghevli and Khan (1980) surveyed some of the
countries included in Table 2 (Brazil, Colombia,
Dominican Republic and Thailand) and found that
fiscal deficits inthose countrieslead to destabilizing
monetary accommodation and inflation. Given the
inflationary experience of countries such as Brazil
and Colombia, it would seem that fiscal deficits
represent a greater problem for monetary policy
than does a market-determined money supply.
While Hong Kong's inflationary performancewas
clearly satisfactory when compared to other econo-
mies during the floating exchange rate period, such
casual observation does not rule out the possibility
that the regime was unstable. After all, the rate of
inflation was much higher during the period of
floating rates, and other factors, such as Hong
Kong's rapid growth, may have disguised the effects
ofan unstable monetary regime. A more formal test
is therefore desirable.
An Empirical Test
Earlier, we noted thatinstable monetary regimes,
disturbances to money and prices tend to correct
themselves. In unstable monetary regimes,
however, they do not, so an increase in the money
supply leads to an increase in the price level, and an
increase in the price level leads to a further increase
in the money supply.
If the hypothesis that Hong Kong's monetary
regime under floating rates was unstable were cor-
rect, money creation should induce inflation and
price increases should have led to further money
creation after 1972. The Hong Kong government's
conservative fiscal stance permits us to rule out
government deficits as the source of any monetary
accommodation that may be found, and allows us to
focus exclusively on whether the operation of the
private market leads to instability.
Before proceeding with an empirical test, it is
appropriate to remark on certain peculiarities of
Hong Kong's statistics. In modemeconomies, it has
become increasingly difficult to determine which
monetary aggregate is mostrelated to nominal gross
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national product or inflation. In Hong Kong, the
problem is complicated by two additional consid-
erations. First, until 1981, money supply data did
not distinguish between the Hong Kong dollar and
foreign currency. Second, Hong Kong does not
separate Eurocurrency operations from domestic
financial transactions. As a result, there may be
large movements in the reported money supply that
are unrelated to domestic economic activity and that
would have no inflationary implications.
The measurementerrorin Hong Kong's monetary
statistics implies that reliable estimates ofthe effect
money may have on prices are not possible. IS Thus,
while preliminary tests suggest that money has a
very weak influence on prices in Hong Kong - a
result that is consistent with our description of a
stable monetary regime in an open economy - this
result is still open to question.
The measurementerrorin Hong Kong's monetary
statistics do not preclude estimates ofthe impact of
prices on money cr~ation. Inflation leading to
money creation is a necessary condition for mone-
tary instability when the money supply is market-
determined, and we will focus on it here. Further-
more, as the share of Eurocurrency transactions is
much largerfor Hong Kong's M2 and M3, tests will
be limited to the effect of prices on MI. One
technique for ascertaining whether prices "cause"
money creation is the test of Granger causality.
Prices are said to "Granger cause" money if past
values ofprices improve the forecast of the current
money supply.
There are a number of ways to implement the
Granger testl9, and two different methods were
attempted here. The first method involved filtering
the monthly series of money and prices for the
period of floating exchange rates to remove trend
and seasonality and to approximate white noise.
Then the cross-correlation of de-trended and de-
seasonalized money with prices was estimated for
priceslagged backwards and forwards 30 months. A
positive cross-correlation between past prices and
current money supply would indicate that "innova-
tions" in prices lead to "innovations" in money, and
would be consistent with the view that prices
"Granger-cause" money. This procedure is dis-
cussed in Pierce and Haugh (1977).Table 3 reports the resultsofth!efirst t!eSt. Forthe
p!eriod January 1973-0ctober 1983, the data failed
to .reject •at .a 10.percent significance kvel·.th!e
hypothesis that the cross-correlation•at 29.lags is
zero. .The •• hypothesis of. zero cross-correlation
would be rejected at 17.lags because tbe cross-
correlation betw!een Past prices and currentmoney
exceeds twostandard!errors forpriceslaggedeleven
montbs (witbiacorrelation.coefficientofO.21) and
thirteen months (coefficient - 0.23). As the filter-
ingproceduredidnotJldly su.cceed in "whitening"
the series, these·coefficients probably reflect an
annual seasonal factor. "Causality" of prices to
money therefore cannot be inferred, and even if it
couldbe, the alternating signs ofthecoefficients are
ambiguous.
One difficulty with theaboveprocedure is thatthe
pre-whitening process may remove any evidence of
a relationship between prices and money. As a
result, an alternative test of Granger causality is
reported below. Furthermore, although itwas earlier
argued that the imposition of a 100 percent liquid
assets ratio requirementonExchange Funddeposits
inFebruary 1979 hadcertainflaws, it may neverthe-
less have affected the link between prices and
money. Subsequent estimation does not extend
beyond this date.
The second test of Granger causality involved
regressing thelogarithmofmoney supplyonitsown
pastvalues as wen as past prices lagged 1 to 12
months:
12 12
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Ifpast prices have significant coefficients, then
they.canbesaid to "Granger callse" money. Evi-
dence of GrangercausaIity is a necessaryblltnot
sufficient condition for. instability.in money•afid
prices. Two starting periods were chosen in the
second test: (1) January 1973 was some six months
after domestic currency assets were permitted as a
basis for note issuance. We have arguedthat tbisis
inconsistent with fixed exchange rates and could
leadto monetaryinstability. (2) November 1974was
when Hong Kong abandoned the effort to peg its
currency to the U.S. dollar. After that month, we
can be certain that any systematic effort to back
domestic currency issuance with foreign assets at a
fixed price was abandoned.
The results are shown inTable 4. As can be seen,
no significant relationship, in the Granger sense,
couldbeestablishedbetweenpastprices andcurrent
money supply. The results therefore suggest that
Hong Kong's monetary regime was stable even
during the period offloating rates.
29Exchange Rate Stability
While Hong Kong's monetary regime underfloat-
ing exchange rates appeared to be stable (in prices),
the inability ofthe governmentto enforce acurrency
peg under floating exchange rates could prove
costly.
This is illustrated by the 1982-83 fall in the value
of the Hong Kong dollar caused by uncertainty
about the future of Hong Kong. This uncertainty
provoked a general shift out of Hong Kong dollar-
denominated assets into foreign currency assets,
and resulted in a drop in the trade-weighted value of
the Hong Kong dollarof27 percentover 15 months.
Furthermore, it is quite possible that the crisis put
the exchange market on a speculative path, on
which expectations about further declines in the
Hong Kong dollar created further pressure on the
currencyand thus tendedto be self-fulfilling. In July
1982, when the Hong Kong dollar began its sharp
decline, the annualized rate ofdepreciation was 7.7
percent. By September 1983 - the last month of
the crisis - the Hong Kong dollar was depreciating
at a 65 percent annual rate. The government was
therefore compelled to take steps to break this
acceleratingerosion in the value ofthe currency. 20
While the Exchange Fund could (and possibly
did) intervene during the 1982-83 crisis by selling
its foreign assets in exchange for Hong Kong dollar
notes, note-issuing banks could fully offset this
intervention by simply printing more notes to
acquire foreign currency assets. 21 As pointed out
previously, the ability of the government to influ-
ence interestrates through the interest-setting agree-
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ment ofthe HKAB also appears to have been quite
limited.
Neither the market mechanism nor the weak
instruments available to the government was suffi-
cient to' control the speculation against the Hong
Kong dollar, so the government halted the Hong
Kong dollar's precipitous drop by reforming the
terms of note issuance. On October IS, 1983, it
announced that it would peg the value of the Hong
Kong dollar at 7.8 Hong Kong dollars per U.S.
dollarand once more require the note-issuing banks
to deposit foreign currency assets with the
Exchange Fund to back note issuance.
The immediate result of this policy was that any
further efforts to shift away from the Hong Kong
dollar would contractthe domestic money supply to
the point where the supply of Hong Kong money
was brought down to the level demanded. Further-
more, it would restore confidence in the Hong Kong
currency, which now had foreign asset backing at a
fixed price. The peg to a strengthening U.S. dollar
was immediately effective and' has been suc-
cessfully maintained, with the result that the Hong
Kong dollarhas appreciated significantly on a trade-
weighted basis since1983 - reversing the trend of
the preceding five years.
This last episode highlights the risk of a market-
determined money supply under floating rates. In
the absence ofdiscretionary instruments for mone-
tary control, the requirement that note issuance be
backed by an internationally traded asset at a fixed
price appears to be necessary to offset shocks that
prompt speculative attacks against the currency.IV. Conclusion
Ourinabilityto find results consistentwithmone-
taryinstability inHong.Kollg is somewhat surpris-
ing given the traditional critique ofthe real bills
doctrine. The result expected from a real bills re-
gime did not occur for one of two reasons. First,
Hong Kong's monetary regime. may actually not
have satisfied the real bills doctrine. This would be
the case ifnote-issuingbanksdid notbase theirIoan
decisions only on lllarket considerations but cared
about the price level and behaved as ifthey were a
modern central bank. Second, proponents of the
real bills doctrine may have been correct in arguing
it would ...not result in price indeterminacy or
instability.
The idea that the private note-issuing banks,
particularly Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, acted
like a central bank is appealing. As the major bank
in Hong Kong, Hongkong and Shanghai Bank pre-
sumably couldbe affected by macroeconomic con-
siderations such as price stability. However, deci-
sions based consistently on public policy
considerations could pose insurmountable prob-
lems for a bank accountable to its stockholders.
There is no evidence, for example, that the
Hongkong and Shanghai Bank voluntarily con·
tracted note issuance, or that the HKAB sought to
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raise interest rates to stabilize exchange rates in
1982-83.. Instead, the governmenthad to impose a
fixed exchange rate regime that would accomplish
the necessary results.
Our· findings are therefore consistent with the
view that a market-determinedmoney supply in a
Small open economY need not.be associated with
price level instability or indeterminacy. Theysug-
gest that monetary authorities under circumstances
similar to those in.Hong Kong could successfully
relax their direct control over monetary aggregates.
Casual observation suggests that certain features of
Hong Kong's economy, such as aconservative fiscal
posture and real wage flexibility, may help this
monetary regime work.
However, the exchange rate regime and the
institutional arrangements underlying it also are
important to Hong Kong's monetary regime. Under
the monetary system in force during the period of
floating exchange rates, Hong Kong had essentially
no instruments to prevent destabilizing speculation
against the Hong Kong dollar. It did not control
interest rates or the monetary base, and could not
rely on the market to stabilize the value of the
currency. Only through the current pegged regime
do these problems appear to have been solved.22ApPENDIX
Formal Treatment of Regimes withAn Er'ldogenous Money Supply
In the case of a classical closed economy, a
regime with an endogenous money supply may be
charllcterizedasfollows(seePlltinkin 1965, Sargent
1979): rF world rate ofinterest




Equation A.I.3 applies because exchange rates
affect aggregate supply in an open economy. A
depreciation will raise consumer prices and reduce
labor supply while not affecting labor demand.
Under fixed exchange rates, equation A.l.4 can
determine the combinations of output and home
prices consistent with equilibrium in the goods
market. Equation A.I.3 determines y with fixed
exchange rates, and, given the foreign interest rate
and the home price, it is possible to determine
nominal money supply in equation A.l.5.
While loan supply is still determined by loan
demand, as was the case in the closed economy
described by equations A.I.I - A.I.2, the problem
ofprice level indeterminacy does not arise here. The
reason is that an increase in loans, and therefore of
M, will result in an offsetting money supply con-
traction to maintain the fixed exchange rate. The
fixed exchange rate guarantees a determinate quan-
tity ofmoney. Adam Smith was aware ofthis result
and, while he subscribed to the real bills doctrine
and a market-determined money supply, he also
would have required banks to ensure that their
monetary liabilities were fully convertible with gold
at a fixed price.
Consider now the case of flexible exchange rates
with an endogenous money supply. The reader may
verify that equations A.I.3 to A.I.5 cannot deter-
mine the nominal levels ofM, P orE. This problem
is compounded by the fact that even output is now
indeterminate. Once more, we may loosely say that
there are too many unknowns given the number of
equations. Reducing one plausible unknown does
where the signs under the arguments correspond to





y = y(E) Aggregate Supply (A. 1.3)
G[y, A(y, rF), B(y, YF' PH/E)] = 0 Goods Market
+ - + + - + (A.1.4)
(M/P) = m(rF' y) Money Market
- + (A.I.5)
where PH represents the price ofgoods produced at
home, E is the domestic currency price of foreign
exchange, and the foreign price is set equal to one.
We may begin by assuming perfect capital mobi-
lity as such a case is the easiest to illustrate. Under
fixed exchange rates, the domestic interest rate
equals the foreign rate ofinterest, andequilibrium is
given by
Given output (y), equation A.I.l can determine
the interest rate (r). Equation A.l.2 can determine
combinations of money (M) and prices (P) that
satisfy money market equilibrium. HQwever, since
money supply is endogenous, both nominal money
and the absolute price level are indeterminate.
Loosely speaking, the number of equations is not
sufficient to determine the number ofunknowns.
Somewhat less familiar is the applicability of
these conclusions to an open economy with flexible
prices. This may be illustratedinthe simplestpossi-
ble manner by modifying equations A.l.l - A.l.2
to incorporatethe effects ofthe external sector in a
small open economy.
The price level in an open economy depends on
both domestic and foreign prices adjusted for the
exchange rate, that is,
G(y,r) = 0
(M/P) = m (r,y)
32Substituting S(r) for MfP into A.I.5, it can be seen
that, under floating rates, the behavior of profit-
maximizing banks ensures an equilibrium. In par-
ticular, A.I.5 and A.I.6 determine the level of
output and, through A.I.3, the exchange rate that
would be consistent with equilibrium. Equation
A.I.4then determines the prices ofhomegoods and
therefore the price level. This will sufficeto deter-
mine the nominal money supply.
not solve the problem. For simplicity, assume ini-
tially that domestic output is fixed, and insulated
from the external sector so equation A.I.3 does not
apply. Then the reader may verify that equations
A.1.4 and A. L5 can determine the optimal real
money balances but not the nominal quantities M
and P, orE.
The above provides a formal interpretation of a
prevalent view that Hong Kong's monetary regime
under flexible exchange rates was indeterminate. It
also appears to be the rationale for the view of the
Asian Monetary Monitor, quoted in the text.
EquationA.I.5, andequation A.I.2, assumethat
real money supply passively adjusts to accommo-
datereal moneydemand. This is thestandard way of
modeling how a real bills regime operates in an
economy with acentral bank. It is also an appropri-
ate way of modeling a market-determined money
supply underfixed exchangerates, as it is consistent
with the view that banks exploit any arbitrage
opportunities arising from deviations from the fixed
rate set by the Exchange Fund.
Hong Kong, however, has no central bankto take
the initiative in adjusting money supply, and equa-
tion A.I.5 does not appear to portray accurately the
behaviorofprofit-maximizing banks undera closed
economy or in an open economy with flexible
exchange rates. In particular, under flexible
exchange rates, A.I.5 suggests that the real money
supply always will be set by banks to equal the real
money demand. At any given interest rate, however,
it is more likely that private banks will only be
willing to supplya limitedamountofcreditbasedon
considerations of cost or default risk. Thus, they
would follow the rule:
Except for Patinkin(1965), most ofthe literature
uses A.I.5 rather than A.I.6 to model the real bills
doctrine. However, A.I.5 is not necessarily consis-
tent with profit-maximization, and more appropri-
ately describes the behavior ofa central bank peg-
ging the interest rate rather than the behavior of
private banks.
A well-defined level of money, prices, and
exchange rates occurs because we have assumed in
equation A.I.3 that the domestic economy is not
fully insulated from the external sector even under
floating rates. Ifwe assumed instead that exchange
rates did not influence the level ofoutput at all, and
that output is fixed, we would once more have a
situation where equation A.1.4determines the ratio
PHfE, and equation A.I.6, the ratio MfP. However,
neither the level ofM nor P can be determined.
Another problem is that if interest rates were
determined abroad, there would be no reason to
suppose that the money supply given by equation
A.I.6 is consistent with the money demand of
equation A.I.5.
However, it is implausible to assume that the
external sector does not influence domestic activity
in a small open economylikeHongKong's. Thus, it
is likely thatHong Kong's nominal money and price
level were well-defined even under floating rates.
We may now examine how similar results can be
obtained if we relax the strong assumption that
domestic and foreign assets are perfect substitutes.
A more elaborate framework will also permit us to
analyze the implications of the interest-setting
agreementofthe Hong Kong Association ofBanks.
Following Tobin and deMacedo (1980), we used
a modified IS-LM approach in which all asset mar-
kets satisfy flow as well as stock equilibrium. Ifwe
assume that the government maintains fiscal bal-
ance, there are four markets: the market for private
domesticbondsorcommercialpaper, the marketfor
foreign bonds, the money market, and the goods
market. By Walras's law, equilibrium in the first
three guaranteesequilibriumin the fourth. Thus, we





y = y(E) Aggregate supply (A.I.3)AH(rH, rp, E, y, a) qH(rH)K 1 =
+ ± + +
I(rh, y) Domestic Bond Market
AF(rH' rp, E, y, a) EF- I =
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to determine the absolute price level P, and the
nominal money supply M in equation A.l.6. Thus,
ina small open economy with flexible exchange
rates and imperfect capital mobility, the price level,
nominal money supply, and exchange rates are
determinate.
m(rH' rp, y) = M/P Money market (A.I.9)
± +
where
rH domestic interest rate
a asset preference shift parameter in-
volving the relative desirability of
domestic and foreign bonds
qh the market valuation of a domestic
bond
K_ 1 the pre-existing capital (or private
domestick bond) stock of foreign
bonds





The arguments ofthe demandfunctions and their
signs are generally familiar. The exchange rates
enter to represent capital gains or losses from hold-
ing assets denominated in different currencies. If
Hong Kong were a net creditor, the net holding of
foreign assets would be positive and capital gains
obtained from holding assets during a depreciation
would be reflected in a rise in a demand for all
assets. The reverse applies ifHong Kong were a net
debtor.
The domestic interest rate, rH' and output can be
determined by substituting S(r) from A.l.6 into
equation A.!.9 and using equation A.!.7. The
corresponding nominal exchange rate follows from
A.l.3, whileequationA.l.8 can then determine the
price of home goods. This is sufficient information
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ImpUc:ations of the Interest-Setting
Agreement
The HKAB sets the interest rates it pays on
deposits, and this rate-setting may affect the corre-
sponding loan rate. Ifwe assume that the interest-
setting agreement of the HKAB were effective in
determining domestic interest rates, there would be
no indeterminacyifbankspassivelysupplied money
according to this interest rate (that is, we could
ignore equation A.l.6). This arrangement is equiv-
alent to a central bank with an interest rate target.
In fact, given such a money supply rule, a fixed
interest rate would be required to obtain a well-
defined nominal equilibrium in money, prices, and
exchange rates. Furthermore, this money supply
rule would permitthe use ofinterestrates as apolicy
tool.
Considerthe 1982-1983 attackon the Hong Kong
dollar which may be described as an effort to shift
from domestic to foreign bonds (apersistentdecline
in thea parameter in equations A.I.7 and A.I.8).
Comparative statics analysis reveals that the shift
would lead to an exchange rate depreciation.
Although not explicitly modeled here, if the
depreciation in tum leads to further efforts to shift
away from the Hong Kong dollar, we would have an
unstable process. In contrast, an increase in interest
rates by the HKAB would create an offsetting ten-
dency towards exchange rate appreciation that may
restore stability.
If we more realistically assume that the money
supply function of profit-maximizing banks is
upward sloping with respect to interest rates (equa-
tion A.l.6) when exchange rates are floating, the
money marketequilibrium could not be guaranteed
unless the Hong Kong Association ofBanks sets rH
in such a way as to ensure that money supply equals
money demand. This is not a trivial calculation, andthe HKAB may set interest rates to create a per-
sistent excess demand for or excess supply of
money.
In the text ofthis article, we have noted that price
instability may thenresult in line with Thornton and
Wicksell's reasoning. Thornton and Wicksell,
however, appear to have been describing a regime
consistentwith A.I.5 ratherthan A.I.6.Ifequation
A.l.6 applies, banks may ration credit rather than
create money given an excess demand for loans, and
it is not obvious that price instability will neces-
sarily follow. Furthennore, the relative weakness of
the HKAB in a small open economy would favor
price stability. Note, however, that the inability of
the HKAB to detennine interest rates in this regime
would mean that there are no policy instruments
available to offset an attack on the value ofthe Hong
Kong dollar, as occurred in 1982-83.
One limitation ofthe discussion in this Appendix
is that the models used- modifications ofstandard
approaches - do not fully capture the role and
motivation of banks in creating money in an open
economy. For example, it would be desirable to
reconcile A.1.5, which we assumed applies under
fixed exchange rates, with A.l.6, assumed to deter-
mine money creation under floating rates. Both
reflect efforts to exploit profit opportunities under
different exchange rate regimes.
Furthennore, in light of the discussion of the
money multiplierinthetext, itwould be desirable to
spell out explicitly what detennines the proportion
offoreign currency deposits banks will convert for
note issuance under fixed exchange rates. Such
exercises would clarify the process by which a
market-determined money supply in an open econ-
omy achieves stability, given the profit-maximizing
behavior of banks. In the meantime, the examples
used serve to illustrate the feasibility of stable,
market-detennined monetary regimes.
FOOTNOTES
1. Oneofthepurposes oltheFederal Reserve Actof 1913,
according to its introduction, is "to furnish an elastic cur-
rency, (and) to afford means of rediscounting commercial
paper". In line with this, Section 13 of the Act states that
Federal Reserve Banks "may discount notes, drafts and
bills of exchange arising out of actual commercial transac-
tions; that is, notes, drafts and bills of exchange issued or
drawn for agricultural, industrial or commercial pur-
poses ..." Note the similarity of this concept to Adam
Smith's definition of the real bills doctrine, quoted in the
next paragraph of the text of this article.
2. Forexample, the Federal Reserve Actsoughtto enforce
application of the real bills doctrine according to this
narrow concept by forbidding the discount of "notes,
drafts or bills covering merely investments or issued or
drawn for the purpose of carrying or trading in stocks
bonds or other investment securities, except bonds and
notes of the government of the United States".
3. Whether banks would succeed in accommodating real
loan demand would depend on the real savings resources
available in the economy. If at a given interest rate, the real
savings resources are less than the demand for loans, the
effort to accommodate loans may lead to the price
instability described by Thornton and Wicksell, and dis-
cussed later in the text.
4. Sargent (1979) and McCallum (1984).
5. This view was not necessarily shared by Adam Smith,
however. See Laidler (1981) and the discussion of the
open economy under fixed exchange rates which follows.
6. As shown in the Appendix, the problem is that the level
of nominal money balances and the price level become
indeterminate. As this concept is less familiar than that of
instability, in the text the term "instability" will be used
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loosely to refer to either indeterminacy or instability. Patin-
kin (1965) observed that indeterminacy arises because a
change in prices does not affect the excess demand for
goods in the economy. In particular, because the money
supply is market-determined under a real bills regime, the
equilibrium in the money market applies independently of
the equilibrium in the goods market. This would not be the
case if the money supply were determined by a central
bank that sought to limit the nominal quantity of money.
7. The dynamic instability of a real bills regime has been
succinctly described in a recent paper by Thomas
Humphrey (1982), who showed that it may be associated
with hyperinflation, hyperdeflation or an indeterminate
price level.
8. For example, Fama (1980) solves the problem of price
stability by suggesting that the chosen numeraire be one
with a value that does not depend on the volume of
deposits outstanding in the financial sector. Sargent and
Wallace (1982) suggest that a real bills regime has certain
welfare properties that make it in some sense superiorto a
regime with "quantity theory" restrictions consistent with
price level stability. While not endorsing the real bills
doctrine, McCallum (1984) shows conditions under which
it may be consistent with price level stability.
9. The description of the operation of the gold standard in
an open economy is attributed to Hume. However, Laidler
(1981) observes that Hume had little to say about the
operation of the financial sector under a gold standard. It
was Adam Smith who first pointed out that full convertibility
of the monetary liabilities of banks with gold was required
to prevent note overissuance. He also recognized that any
excess supplyofmoneywould"spill over" intothe external
sector.10. The equilibrium of this system is described in the
simplest terms in the Appendix, using the flexible price
version of the Mundell-Fleming model.
11. This is a traditional government viewpoint, according
to a former Financial Secretary. See Philip Haddon-Cave
(1984).
12. Philip Haddon-Cave (1984). As a result of this fiscal
conservatism, Hong Kong had no marketable government
debtoutstanding in 1982.
13. Wallace (1983) argues that reserve requirements
would also be necessary to ensure that banks hold the
currency liabilities of the government. However, ifhand-to-
hand currency were legal tender and the circulation of
foreign notes forbidden, as it is in Hong Kong, these
conditions may suffice to create a demand for the legal
tender. For a related discussion, see Keeley and Furlong's
paper in this issue of the Economic Review, and Fama
(1983).
14. This of course does not preclude a central bank from
following a policythat accommodates the market demand
for money by targetting exchange rates or interest rates.
However, it is still the central bank rather than the private
sector that retains the initiative for money creation in this
case.
15. Using a different framework, Beers, Sargent and Wal-
lace have argued that the exchange rate was indetermi-
nate in Hong Kong during the period of floating rates.
Exchange rates couldalso be indeterminate underfloating
rates if Hong Kong money and foreign moneywere perfect
substitutes, as shown by Kareken and Wallace (1981) in
the context of an overlapping generations model. Maxwell
Fry (1985) has also arqued that Hong Kong's monetary
regime in the floating rate period was unstable. Our gen-
eral description of Hong Kong's monetary system under
fixed and floating rates is closer to that of the Asian
Monetary Monitor.
16. Asian Monetary Monitor, Vol. 7, NO.6.
17. A similar problem applied to the objective of the
Exchange Fund ofmaintaining full foreign asset backing of
note issuance. Under floating exchange rates, it is not
clear what "full backing" means, since a fixed amount of
foreign assets may "back" an increasing quantity of note
issuanceas the currencydepreciates. Thus, the "backing"
would not limit note issuance underfloating rates, and, as
argued in the text, would not be effective in pegging the
exchange rate because note issuancewould not be limited
by the availability of foreign exchange assets.
In contrast, under fixed exchange rates, the Hong Kong
dollar is fully backed in the sense that at the rate set bythe
government, the Exchange Fund always has enough for-
eign currency assets to redeem on demand any quantityof
Hong Kong dollar notes in circulation. The fact that Hong
Kong dollar note issuance is limited by foreign asset
availabilityat the fixed rate ensures that the currencypeg is
enforceable.
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18. Technically, the measurement error in the money
series implies that when used as an explanatory variable
for prices, it is correlated with the error term. This "errors in
variables" problem implies that the estimated coefficient
on money would be inconsistent.
19. Sims (1972) and Haugh andPierce(1977).
20. Theexchangerate dropwas precipitated bya crash in
the real estate market that reduced the loan collateral of
banks and consequently their net worth. Beers, Sargent
and Wallace (1983) present the intriguing hypothesis that
the governmentmay have allowed the exchange rate to
depreciate to reduce the Hong Kong dollar deposit lia-
bilities of banksand thus to improve their balance sheets.
Ketkar and Sweet (1984) discussthe balance sheet struc-
ture underwhich a depreciation will actually benefit banks,
and suggest there is an optimal rate of depreciation (or
appreciation) depending on the particular balance sheet
structure of banks. As a general point, it should also be
noted that, to benefit from a depreciation, the foreign
assets of banks should exceed their foreign liabilities. In
this way, their wealth increases from capital gains induced
by a depreciation (see discussion of the Tobin-de Macedo
model in the Appendix).
Although it is not clear that the balance sheet structure of
banks in Hong Kong would have benefited from a
depreciation in 1982-1983, the Beers, Sargent and Wal-
lace argument highlights the potential use of exchange
rate policy to satisfy certain objectives in the financial
sector. This novel point raises many interesting questions
for policy, but our discussion suggests that during the
period offloating rates, the Hong Kong government simply
did not have the instruments to conduct a deliberate
exchange rate policy of the sort described by Beers,
Sargent and Wallace.
21. In fact, note-issuing banks could speculate against
the value of the currency by increasing the rate of note
issuanceto purchase foreign assets. The dataon currency
creation during 1982-1983 suggest that this did not hap-
pen atthe time ofthe attack on theHong Kong dollar, butin
principle, this could be a destabilizing sour~e of note
issuance.
22. This is nollosaythat afixed exchange rate regime has
no disadvantages. It is not obvious that pegging to a
strongly appreciating currency such as the U.S. dollar was
the best course. Furthermore, Hong Kong's money crea-
tion and domestic inflation rate are particularly vulnerable
to external disturbances under this regime.REFERENCES
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